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During the decade of the 1970 's, the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) became a major Communist bloc actor on the
African continent. While neither as visible nor as numerous
as Soviet and Cuban personnel, East German activity in Africa
has steadily increased. Yet, Western analysts have been slow
to recognize, or acknowledge, the expanding East German
presence in Africa. The purpose of this study, which is not
r.ieant to be all-inclusive, is essentially three-fold:
1) to explore the reasons behind past and present East
German involvement in Africa;
2) To examine the types of activities the GDR has been
and continues to be engaged in;
3) To hypothesize about future trends in East German
foreign policy in Africa and the Third World.
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Communist bloc involvement in Africa is both intensive
and widespread; with the exception of the Soviet Union and
Cuba, no other Communist nation has pursued a more assertive
African policy than the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
.
While the GDR follows a policy that is harmonious with
Moscow's, it is at the same time pursuing an aim of its own -
one that stems from the long-held position not as a sovereign
state, but as the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany.
Rejected so long by the Western world, East Berlin used its
African ties first as a means to establish a national identity
and then to foster its prestige and reputation as a medium-
sized state committed to supporting progressive forces of
change. Owing to its unique and unenviable position, the GDR
was not fully accepted by African nations until the late
1960's, even though it had been active on the continent since
the late 1950' s. Once Sudan, the first to establish formal
diplomatic relations with East Germany, had broken the ice,
others quickly followed its lead. The result was a rapid,
even spectacular, rise to prominence.
Current East German involvement in Africa is perhaps
most notably marked by the increased emphasis on military and
security matters (the GDR's economic policies are of basically
the same nature as other Eastern European nations) . This role
has, in fact, become so extensive and open that it has begun

to rival the Cuban presence. While Cuba's military involve-
ment has apparently stabilized, the GDR's seems still to be
increasing
.
Chapter II deals with early East German initiatives in
Africa, particularly as they relate to the GDR's search for
international legitimacy and its competition with the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG)
. This chapter is intended to high-
light the motivations behind East Germany's initial thrust in
Africa and to underscore the unique position which the GDR
occupied as a result of its early pariah statehood.
Chapter III examines in depth the GDR-Soviet relationship.
Any discussion of East German foreign policy must underscore,
initially, the inseparability of the policies of these two
countries. A concerted effort at the international level is,
in reality, a reflection of the closeness of the Soviet Union
and East Germany at the regional (i.e. Warsaw Pact/CMEA)
level. The interlocking aspects of the GDR-Soviet Union
alliance necessarily place restraints upon East German activi-
ties abroad. At the same time, however, close integration
makes the GDR a reliable and highly valued asset of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy.
Chapter IV discusses those significant factors, both
internal and external, which combined to form the enabling
framework for a more assertive East Germany. Without the
particular set of motivating circumstances which coalesced
in the late 1960 's and early 1970 's, the ways and means for

an expanding foreign policy would have been lacking.
Chapter V investigates specific activities carried out
by East Germany in its recent African endeavors. It depicts
both a generalized picture of the East German role and dis-
cusses specific case studies which more fully illustrate the
GDR's missions and functions within the broader framework of
a Soviet-led African policy.
Chapter VI deals, somewhat hypothetically , with those
factors which may limit any further expansion of East German
activities in Africa. While the foreign policy successes
enjoyed by the GDR in the 1970's were considerable, events
on the domestic front, as well as in Africa itself, may
circumscribe future successes.
Finally, Chapter VII attempts to determine what might be
expected from East German foreign policy initiatives in the
current decade. Recent international events of significance
are examined in order to assess their influence upon the
direction of future GDR policies. In light of a possible
tempering of conflict in Africa (e.g. the Zimbabwe settle-
ment and the positive effect that may have on other areas of
conflict in Africa) and increasing instability in other areas
of the strategic Third World, it is not unreasonable to
speculate that the Soviet Union may refocus its efforts.
East Berlin, in turn, may have to adjust its own policies
to coincide with those of the Kremlin.
This study has benefited greatly from the counseling and
assistance provided by Dr. Jiri Valenta, Coordinator, Soviet
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and East European Studies, National Security Affairs
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. I would also
like to express my appreciation to Dr. David Albright, Senior
Text Editor, Problems of Communism . In July 1979, Dr. Valenta
and Dr. Albright were able, with the support of the Naval
Postgraduate School Foundation Research Program, and the
personal support of Dean William Tolles, to conduct a confer-
ence on the Communist States in Africa. I v/as fortunate
enough to be able to help coordinate this conference, the
results of which will be published as a book by Indiana
University Press in the summer of 1980. Through their
efforts, I had the opportunity to discuss my research on East
Germany and Africa with Dr. Melvin Croan, a leading expert on
the GDR and Mr. Colin Legum, noted journalist of the London
Observer and long-time analyst of the African political scene.
Subsequent correspondence with Mr. Legum provided valuable
information and insight which contributed immeasurably to the
quality of my research.
I would also like to thank Michael Clough, Coordinator,
African Studies, and Dr. David Yost for their advice and
assistance. Professor Clough arranged my interview (in May
1980) with Ambassador Donald Easum, former Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs and Ambassador to
Nigeria, and currently President of the African-American
Institute. Ambassador Easum's first-hand knowledge of
African affairs provided new insights into the problems of
the East-West competition in Africa. Through Dr. Yost's
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efforts I was- able to interview several key members of the
West German Ministry for Intra-German Relations: Dr
Hansjiirgen Schierbaum, Under Deputy Minister, Dr. Siegfried
Georg, Head, Political Analysis Division, and Dr. Manfred
Ackermann. These gentlemen furthered my understanding of
the intra-German relationship and provided valuable insight
into the unique situation of the two Germanies. Dr. William
Robinson of Radio Free Europe was most helpful in assisting
my research at that distinguished organization where I was
able to obtain a great deal of useful information on specific
aspects of East Germany's activities in Africa. Finally, I
would like to thank Dr. Barry Schutz of the Rand Corporation
who motivated my interest in this subject.
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II. EARLY GDR INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA
A. CONCEPTUALIZATION
When the GDR became initially involved in Africa in the
late 1950's, it was part of an overall effort for achieving
international legitimacy and, coincidental with this ob-
jective, to use Africa as an arena for countering the
Hallstein Doctrine. These efforts were notably non-military
in nature, instead involving the formation of commercial and
cultural ties with various nations to be used as stepping
stones for expanded diplomatic relations and, ultimately,
full diplomatic recognition.
East Germany became gradually involved in Guinea and
Ghana, in the late 1950's, and in other countries (most
notably Egypt, Algeria, Mali and Tanzania) in the 1960 's.
East Germany did manage to conclude several agreements in
various fields which opened the door for subsequent moves
into the continent (Table I). By 1968, the GDR had a number
of varied relations and agreements with thirteen African
nations; these are portrayed in Table II.
Despite these "advances," the GDR encountered the
Hallstein Doctrine at every bend in the road. For example,
when Zanzibar (which had recognized East Germany prior to
the union with Tanganika) merged with Tanganika in the mid-
1960 's, the Tanzanian government immediately announced that
the East German mission in Zanzibar had ceased to hold
13

embassy status and that the decision to accept the establish-
ment of an East German consulate-general in Dar-es-Salaam was
not intended to give nor to imply diplomatic recognition.
Other African countries with whom the GDR had agreements
were also quick to make it clear to Bonn that these agree-
ments, as well as the establishment of trade missions, in no
way meant diplomatic relations had been established.
Perhaps the case of Guinea and Ghana best illustrate not
only the type of activity the GDR engaged in, in its early
African ventures, but also the diplomatic complications it
encountered as it sought to gain international recognition.
B. CASE STUDIES
1 . Guinea
East Germany sought its first opportunity for
recognition after Guinea's indepependence in 1958. Guinea
was initially ignored by the Western world which left the
door open for Communist inroads into the country, first by
official recognition of the new government and subsequently
by various trade and cultural agreements.
On November 17, 1958, Guinea signed its first ever
international treaty with the GDR. The provisions of the
treaty were largely commerce-oriented and included, most
importantly for the GDR, the authorization to establish a
trade mission, with consular privileges, in Conakry. The
mission opened with a great deal of fanfare in early 1959,
and while the consul general was officially entitled the
14

Trade Representative of the GDR, he enjoyed a quasi-
ambassadorial status. In fact, he was listed as the GDR
ambassador in the telephone book.
Meanwhile', the FRG, which like other Vies tern
countries had been slow to recognize the new government,
finally established a trade mission in the summer of 1959,
preparatory to full diplomatic recognition which occurred
later that same year. While the East Germans had arrived
first and maintained a large staff at their trade mission
(in comparison to a very small FRG embassy staff) , West
Germany was soon to experience several blows to its own
African policy which in turn would impact negatively on the
GDR.
The first jolt to the FRG came in early March 1960
when, using the United Nations as the forum, the Guinean
government charged West Germany with aiding France, both
technically and financially, in the production of the Sahara
atom bomb; at the same time, the FRG was charged with pro-
viding troops to fight alongside the French Foregin Legion
in Algeria. Although Bonn denied both charges, it barely
had time to recoup its diplomatic losses when the East Germans
announced the establishment of formal diplomatic relations
v/ith Guinea. It was time for the FRG to act, but instead of
immediate application of the Hallstein Doctrine, the Bonn
government decided to make sure that the facts, as presented
by East Germany, realistically described the situation.
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In retrospect, this delaying tactic on the part of
the West German government was probably the best solution
to a situation which could prove highly embarrassing to it-
self and the Guinean government. First of all, it gave Sekou
Toure time to work out a suitable game plan which would not
alienate the FRG and which, at the same time, would paint
the situation as a mere misunderstanding. The FRG, rather
than employing highly visible, blackmail-like actions in the
form of the Hallstein Doctrine, was able to exert more
subtle and less visible diplomatic pressures on the Guinean
government
.
The outcome, then was favorable to the FRG, but
coincidentally , did no serious damage to the government of
Guinea. Toure explained that East German officials had
created the false impression that diplomatic relations had
been established between Guinea and the GDR. All that was
intended was that the East German trade representative in
Conakry be given the privileges of ambassadorial rank to
facilitate his tasks in the trade sphere. If Guinea had
thought that Bonn would be angered by this situation, the
West Germans would have been consulted before any action
was taken. Soon after this Toure pronouncement, the West
German special envoy to Guinea returned to Bonn with the
news that had been feverishly awaited - diplomatic relations
did not exist between Guinea and East Germany.
For the GDR, the solution resulted not only in
public embarrassment, but also in a significant setback in
16

its search for recognition. While the GDR continued its
commercial agreements with Guinea, and in fact, even expan-
ded them, the political setback far outweighed the other
accomplishments. East Berlin had once again failed in its
efforts to break out of international political isolation
and to achieve a political victory over the Federal
Republic in Africa. It wasn't until late 1970 that Guinea
and the GDR finally established formal diplomatic relations.
2 . Ghana
East Germany's relationship with Ghana dates back
to early 1959 when it signed the first of many agreements
on aid, trade and cultural cooperation with the Nkrumah
government; subsequently, a trade mission was established
in Accra. During the years of fruitful relationships
between the two (1959-1966), the GDR granted Ghana the
equivalent of $24 million for the construction of industrial
plants (the largest GDR grant to any sub-Saharan country),
negotiated a long-term trade and payments agreement, and
signed, in August 1960, a cultural exchange agreement
calling for an increase in East German educational assis-
tance as well as the establishment of a 'friendship center'
4m Accra.
While these events were occurring, Bonn was not
idle. In September 1960, the Ghanian government had negoti-
ated a technical assistance agreement with a consortium of
West German engineering firms, calling for cooperation in
17

the economic development of the African nation, West German
financial assistance to Ghana, and for the training of
Ghanian technicians in the FRG with a view to preparing them
for leading positions in Ghana's industry. Bonn's generous
economic assistance to Ghana, however, failed to curtail
GDR-Ghana relationships. In this connection, the Ghana
Times had published an editorial in March 1960, stressing
that Ghana did not wish to take sides in the political and
diplomatic contests between the two German governments, and
that it insisted on its right to maintain good relations
with both.
Relations between the GDR and Ghana might, then,
have continued to prosper had not East Germany been involved
in clashes with Nkrumah's military successor - the National
Liberation Council (NLC)
.
Deterioration in relations began with the "Krueger
Affair" named after Major Juergen Krueger, an East German
officer, reportedly of the GDR Security Services, who had
trained Nkrumah's personal security force and other persons
in the Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs, "in the techniques
of espionage and covert activities." Krueger was arrested
in March 1966, but was subsequently exchanged for an offi-
cial of the Ghanian trade mission in East Berlin who had
been held as hostage for Major Krueger.
This incident set off a series of retaliatory
moves by both countries, culminating in the closure of




foothold in the country was lost, and it was only in mid-
1970 that Ghana again permitted the GDR to reopen its trade
mission.
C . SUMMARY
While the East Germans did not disengage from the
African continent as a result of their early setbacks, they
were forced by events essentially beyond their control to
follow a go-slow strategy. It wasn't until the early 1970's
that the GDR was able to assert itself on the African scene.
This new policy was brought about by changing international
conditions, as well as by factors within the GDR itself. The
second stage of East German initiatives in Africa, which
began in the early 1970's, has witnessed a shift both in the
types of involvement and the geographic area to which atten-
tion is focused. The on-going East German policy has placed
primary emphasis on military and security matters, and the
African national liberation movements, as well as Angola,
Mozambique and Ethiopia (all three Marxist-Leninist espousing
countries), have received the most attention.
Before dicussing these new trends in GDR-African relations,
however, it is necessary to review the GDR-Soviet connection.
Whatever East Germany's policies and goals are on the African
continent, they are, of necessity, harmonious with those of
its Kremlin mentors. And while Africa may offer new and
unique opportunities for the East German regime, the GDR
would not be undertaking such an active role without the
19





III. THE GDR SOVIET FRATERNAL ALLIANCE
The unbreakable friendship and cooperation with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet
people have always been and will continue to be, the
source of strength and the basis for the development
of the socialist German Democratic Republic. 7
With these words from the program of the Ninth Congress
of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), held in East Berlin in
May 1976, the GDR reaffirmed its close alignment with the
Soviet Union. Walter Ulbricht had normally maintained such
a course, but his dispute with the Kremlin in the late 1960s
and early 1970s over the Moscow-Bonn rapprochment , which
ultimately led to his downfall in 1971, had strained the
relationship. Since his ouster, however, the GDR-Soviet
alliance has drawn ever closer under the leadership of Erich
Honecker, a pro -Moscow hardliner.
The closeness of the two countries is manifested in
intensive cooperation at all levels of inter-state relation-
ships: military/security, economic and politico - ideological
.
This "cooperation" has, in fact, an air of East German sub-
ordination. It is essential to keep this latter aspect in
mind, particularly when discussing East German activities at
the international level. Whatever the GDR ' s activities are
in that arena, they are in essence a reflection of the close
ness of integration with the Soviet Union at the regional
level. Hermann Axen, SED Politburo member, put it this way:
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The present stage of development in relations between
the GDR and the USSR is marked by their drawing to-
gether in every sphere... Now we can, and will increasingly
contribute to implementing the coordinated foreign policy
of the socialist countries ... The GDR's stronger inter-
national position has increased its responsibility for
implementing the common line of the socialist community.
A. MILITARY/SECURITY INTEGRATION
Although this aspect of GDR-Soviet relations is univer-
sally accepted, the actual nature and extent of the sub-
ordination of the East German National People's Army (NVA)
to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) is not that
well documented. There are some features, however, which
stand out and instantly catch the eye. For example:
1) the NVA, alone among Eastern bloc armed forces, is
directly subordinated to the Supreme Command of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization;
2) The 1957 bi-lateral military agreement between the
GDR and the Soviet Union, which still governs the station-
ing of Soviet troops in East Germany, provides for more
latitude for GSFG individual actions than any other compar-
able agreement between the Soviets and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries. In effect, the agreement stipulates that
the GSFG high command may deal "with any threat to its
security at will, subject only to 'appropriate consultations'
9
with the East German authorities;"
3) Since 1973, East German combat training has been
patterned after the Soviet model and cooperation between
the NVA and GSFG now reaches to the company level.
22

For example, Neues Deutschland reported joint GDR-GSFG
training at the "small unit level" in February 1980:
On Thursday [14 February] the motorized riflemen
of the Hans Kahl National People's Army unit and of
the Soviet "regiment nearby" displayed their military
skill in a joint combat exercise. .. the units of
Captain Juergen Tonai and Lieutenant Sergei Shatrin
scored very good and good results, under difficult
conditions . 1™
Even the paramilitary training of the Pioneer Organization,
the GDR youth group for ages 6 to 14 years, is reportedly
supervised by Soviet "advisors." As Defense Minister Heinz
Hoffman so aptly noted, "We cannot learn enough about inten-
sive training from the Soviet comrades."
Yet, it appears the Soviets have not been insensitive to
the position of their East German brothers-in-arms . General
Hoffman, alone among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact National
commanders, has had the distinction of commanding three
major Pact military exercises. And, the Soviet Union has
tended to supply the NVA with modern military equipment
ahead of the other Pact military forces. For instance, the
GDR is now receiving the T-72 tank. While these actions
can be seen as a measure of the degree of confidence the
Soviet Army places in the capability and reliability of the
NVA, at the same time it can be viewed as an overt Soviet
attempt to maintain morale at an acceptable level.
Despite such s igns of Soviet favor, however, other
factors tend to reinforce a continued subordination of the
NVA. The NVA, though well -equipped and well trained, is
relatively small: six divisions (two tank and four
23

motorized), with an air arm of about 350 fighter aircraft,
plus a small navy operating in the Baltic. Withdrawal of
Soviet forces (or a substantial number thereof) would require
a build-up of the NVA, a situation which the Soviet Union has
not yet judged (and probably will never judge) propitious.
Further, were the Soviets to assign new responsibilities to
the NVA, without relinquishing its nuclear monopoly, renewed
pressures from the GDR for nuclear-sharing would seem likely
to ensue. Finally, any proposal to boost the size (and it
follows, the status) of the NVA would not only expose the
Soviet Union to charges from the West of encouraging the
revival of German militarism, but also would probably have
equally sensitive implications for the GDR' s Eastern European
neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Thus, the NVA ' s posi-
tion vis a vis the GSFG is not likely to improve.
In the field of security matters, while details are
lacking, it can probably be assumed that the GDR's State
Security Service (SSD) is closely interlocked with the KGB.
It can probably also be reasonably assumed that the SSD takes
its cues from the KGB as was probably the case when the Zaire
-
OTRAG treaty (see pages 52 - 56) was stolen from Zaire's West
German embassy. Under any circumstances it is difficult to
imagine an absence of security cooperation in the GDR-Soviet
alliance when the intelligence function plays such an impor-




To simply state that the Soviet Union is the principal
trading partner of the GDR does not do justice to the
fullness of integration at this level of inter-state rela-
tions. Behind the closeness of the economic ties that bind
lies not only the fact of East Germany's early pariah state-
hood but also the truly remarkable economic recovery of the
GDR in the early 1960s which, in its own right, can be
termed an economic miracle. This miracle placed the GDR at
the developmental pinnacle of the Soviet-East European bloc
While the GDR actively sought closer economic ties with the
Soviet Union, the latter most certainly welcomed not only
the fruits of a modernized East Germany industry, but also
the GDR as a major recipient of Soviet products, especially
in light of the terms of trade which were heavily biased
towards the Soviet Union.
The economic aspects of Soviet-East German relations
date to the year 1945 when the Soviet zone of occupation was
subjected to the Soviet reparations program. Originally
reparations were to come from both its own zone and a small
percentage from the other zones. In exchange, the Soviets
were to supply food to the Western occupying power. This ar-
rangement quickly ais integrated and the Soviet Union stepped
up its reparations in its own zone, dismantling and carrying
off entire factories and converting numerous industrial
operations into Soviet stock corporations with all produc-
tion from these corporations going to the Soviet Union.
25

The Soviets also nationalized banks, what was left of the
large industrial enterprises, former Nazi holdings and the
property of people who had fled westward. All land holdings
over 100 hectares were seized and distributed to landless
farmers, agricultural laborers and German refugees from
Eastern Europe, setting the stage for later collectivization.
The GDR's first five-year plan, following the Soviet
model, was initiated in 1951 but after the riots of 1953
was scaled down several times. The second five-year plan
(1956-1960) was coordinated with the newly established
Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) , in which the
GDR was to play an increasingly important role. This second
plan was largely unsuccessful and was abandoned in 1958 in
favor of a seven-year plan designed to harmonize with the
rhythm and demands of Soviet long-term planning. The seven-
year plan assured the increasing GDR dependence on the Soviet
Union, since it and its predecessors emphasized heavy in-
dustry which called for increased imports of raw materials
from the Soviet Union.
The GDR proclaimed a "New Economic System" (NES) in 1963
at the Sixth SED Congress, modifying important aspects of
their previous central planning system. Most notably, the
NES called for decentralized management and economic in-
centives. The work of factory managers was now judged by
standards of profitability, turnover and cost effectiveness
(within, of course, a planned framework). These shifts in
the economy were in accordance with the theories of the
Soviet economist Yevsei Liberman.
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The NES succeeded in bringing substantial growth to the
East German economy, but the almost total commitment to a
few special industries - instrumentation, electronics and
chemicals - whose products the GDR exported to CMEA members,
primarily the Soviet Union, led to a relatively weak infra-
structure. The NES was revised and finally abandoned in
1970.
It was in the 1970s that the Soviet Union and East
German economies, although always close, reached the apex of
coordination; this trend will apparently continue into the
1980s. Gone was the thorn in the Soviet's side, Walter
Ulbricht, and in his place was an even more pro-Soviet hard-
liner, Erich Honecker, whose main emphases lay in a return to
the basics of Marxism-Leninism and to closer ties with the
Soviet Union and other socialist states. The course set by
Honecker in 1971 has been steadfastly followed and was
underscored during the Ninth Congress of the SED in 1976.
Commenting upon the results of that conference, A. Ivanov
noted
:
The GDR's relations with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries have made further headi/ay toward
reaching a new and higher level. For example, it is
with the aid of the USSR... that the GDR has solved a
historically important problem of eliminating the
immense disproportions in the national economy caused
by Germany's split... the recent period, specifically
the last five years, have shown that the Republic's
economy is no\v mainly oriented toward cooperating
with the Soviet Union.... 15
In 1975, and again in 1980, the five-year plans of the
Soviet Union and East Germany were very closely coordinated.
27

The protocol on the 1981-1985 cooperation was signed into
effect in early February 1980, and among other things,
serves once again to underscore the dependence of the GDR
on Soviet exports of raw materials. An East German econo-
mist stated:
As far as we are concerned, this is an event of para-
mount, even vital importance. We have the insurance
that the Soviet Union will supply us with the most
important raw materials for the forthcoming five-year
plan. .. During these five years the Soviet Union will
deliver to us very large quantities of important
fuels, mineral raw materials, metals, basic chemical
substances and a lot of other materials for the support
of the national economy. The deliveries .. .will also
include 95 million tons of crude oil and 32.5 billion
cubic meters of natural gas . 16
The protocol also calls for increased specialization and
cooperation of production between the two states up to 1990,
and for the further pooling of material resources and scien-
tific-technical potentials of both countries throughout the
1980s.
This heavy emphasis upon raw materials, particularly the
spelling out of the volumes of oil and natural gas, reflects
the deep concern of the GDR over the continued accessibility
of these resources, and at a price, which while high, is
still below world prices.
C. POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
The close, comprehensive cooperation between the SED and
the CPSU, "constitutes the vital core of relations between
the GDR and USSR. (The two parties together) direct and co-
ordinate the entire multifaceted and interlocking system of
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relations between both states and assure its functioning as
a unified whole on the basis of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism." This statement on Soviet-GDR party relation-
ships is not entirely polemical. It is, in fact, supported
by hard evidence of close interlocking through the prolifer-
ation of bi-lateral exchanges found in the top echelons and
siphoning down through the various party organs to at least
the district level. This interlocking is made all the more
feasible by the close similarity of the SED and CPSU organi-
zational structure. Party organization and the specific
interlocking aspects of the Soviet-GDR superstructure have
been well described by Dr. Melvin Croan and will not be
discussed here. Suffice it to say that these interlocking
relationships are well on the way to becoming an institu-
tionalized pattern of SED and CPSU inter-party relationships
Further, the unity manifested in the political realm has
been used by East Germany to reassert, regionally, the
importance of Soviet leadership of the East European
Communist bloc, specifically, and the World Communist Move-
ment in general. Robert Livingston notes that:
Politically, the Kremlin has been able to count upon
the consistent and outspoken support of East Berlin
against polycentric tendencies in the Communist Move-
ment, whether of the Maoist, West European (especially
Italian Communist), and East European revisionist, or
Yugoslav and Romanian nationalist varieties. In both
the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the GDR acts as a centri-
petal force reinforcing alliance cohesion. .. Diminished
Soviet political and ideological authority in the
Communist world has served to confer a special role ,
«
upon the GDR as a staunch supporter of Soviet policies.
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In the ideological sphere, the GDR has set itself up, in
line with Soviet thinking, as the 'model' of socialist
internationalism, defined (by the Soviet Union) as:
The existence of alleged general regular patterns in
the development towards socialism (patterns taken from
Soviet development) , the subordination of each Marxist
party to a 'united world movement' (under Soviet leader-
ship), and the observance of an 'international general
line' (determined by the Soviet leadership) . 19
The revised 1968 constitution (amended in October, 1974) of
the GDR includes the concept of socialist internationalism
and makes it the constitutional duty for the GDR to develop
all-around friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union
and other socialist states in accordance with this concept.
Both domestically and in foreign relations, socialist inter-
nationalism has guided East German actions, and the close-
ness of the GDR and the Soviet Union in economic, military
and political matters has its roots in East German subordina
tion to the Soviet lead in ideological matters.
D. THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALIST DIVISION OF LABOR
While the scope and depth of GDR integration with the
Soviet Union (as well as the concomitant dependence on and
subordination to the Soviet lead in all matters) places con-
straints upon its foreign policy, the very closeness of the
relationship makes the GDR a valuable asset to the Soviet
Union's foreign policy in the Third World. East German
know-how and expertise in management, in military and civil
and secret police matters, as well as a long tradition of
efficiency, are all useful tools which can be easily
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translated from the regional context (i.e. Warsaw Pact/CMEA)
into the international environment. Given these skills, what
then are the tasks assigned to the GDR within the parameters
of a Soviet-led African policy? Broadly stated, the GDR's
tasks are focused on the practice of "applied pro-Leninism,"
defined as
:
something apart from, and potentially more significant
than, the technical advice and material aid rendered
by the GDR to particular military and/or guerrilla
operations. Rather, it encompasses all those activi-
ties pertaining to the consolidation of pox^er, the
exercise of control, and the inauguration of socio-
economic change that comprise the pre -requisites for




The socialist internationalist "division of labor" has
often been superficially described as the Soviets providing
the basic wherewithal and direction, the Cubans the bodies,
and the East Germans the brains. The policies of each, and
their mutual relationships, are, however, much more compli-
cated. East Germany • s assigned tasks in Africa, illustrated
by way of case studies, is the subject of succeeding sections
The on-going GDR role in Africa is perhaps most visibly
distinguished from early East German involvement there by
a bold assertiveness . This new ambitiousness is the result
of several internal and external changes which occurred in
the late 1960 ' s and early 1970' s and which provided the en-
abling framework for East Germany • s zealous African foreign
policy in recent years.
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The East German Inferiority Complex
The East German regime still suffers from a chronic
identity crisis. The ambitious policies in Africa in the
1970's are, at least in part, motivated by this persistent
inferiority complex. There are at least three reasons for
the domestically highly publicized policy of the GDR in
Africa
:
1) it serves to increase the public's awareness
and acceptance of a national political identity, thus re-
inforcing the regime's efforts to differentiate itself from
West Germany;
2) Africa provides the means for continuing the
rivalry with the Federal Republic, offering East German
propagandists ample opportunity to attack the neo-colonialism
of the capitalist West German state;
3) East Germany's aid to selected African nations
and national liberation movements serves to enhance the
regime's prestige which in turn could contribute to an in-
creased, popularly based legitimacy. In combination, all
three might bolster regime stability and diminish the attrac-





Economic Needs as a Factor
The recent signing of an economic protocol with the
Soviet Union will guarantee continued deliveries of energy-
related materials to the GDR, at least until 1985. While
the GDR can pay for some of these imports by exporting its
products to the Soviet Union, the price of oil has in-
creased to such an extent that the GDR's terms of trade with
the Soviet Union, which began worsening in 1975, are expected
to continue to do so unless compensatory measures can be
taken. Adding to this dilemma is the high net hard currency
debt of the GDR ($5.9 billion in 1977 - second only to
Poland in the non-Soviet Eastern bloc) and the high debt-
service ratio (in 1977, for example, the GDR's debt-service
ratio was listed as 40, meaning that unless it were to re-
finance, it would have to devote 40% of its hard currency
21
export earnings just to service its outstanding debts.)"
With these serious economic problems, then, the East German
regime is faced with answering the problem of how it will
obtain the additional resources to pay the USSR for the
increasing costs of oil. (The Soviet Union has, since 1975,
changed its own policies with regard to intra-CMEA price
changes, particularly in oil, permitting it to readjust
prices of its exports based on world prices for the pre-
ceding five years rather than adhering to a fixed-price
policy as previously practised)
.
There are, of course, ways to generate currency.
One is to export arms to Third World countries on a cash,
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rather than aid/grant basis. This is precisely what the
Soviet Union has done; but the GDR's indigenous arms industry
is small, so that arms transfers is not a viable option.
Offering one's services to the Soviet Union in military-
related matters [inter alia) is, however, an option open to
the GDR. In this context, it is interesting to note that
Article 8 of the 1875 Soviet Union-GDR treaty of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance alludes to the fact that in
case of attack, assistance is no longer limited to Europe and
that therefore the GDR could presumably be expected to render
aid to the USSR in other areas, for example, the Third World
and, of course, Africa. The treaty was signed in the same
year that the price of Soviet oil exports to CMEA members
was adjusted upwards, causing the GDR's terms of trade to
deteriorate substantially.
There are some other feasible and important economic
reasons. East Germany is probably also interested in build-
ing potential markets for its manufactured goods which are
not sophisticated enough for West European markets. Addition-
ally, East Germany has cultivated relations with non-socialist
oil-producing nations in Africa, most notably Algeria,
Libya and, to some degree, Nigeria. The explanation for
these inter-state connections lies most plausibly in the
GDR's search for new sources of oil. This aspect of GDR-
African relations is more clearly understood when one
considers that although the USSR will supply East Germany
with oil (and other energy -related products) through 1985,
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the amount will not meet the GDR's increasing needs; the
Soviet Union has urged all its Eastern European neighbors to
seek supplementary sources.
Finally, over recent years the Soviet Union has been
pressing its Warsaw Pact allies to increase their annual
monetary contributions to the alliance budget. It can be
speculated that the GDR's increased military and security
activities in Africa have been undertaken in partial compen-
sation for direct financial contributions which would be
difficult to make given the GDR's hard currency and foreign
2 2debt problems.
While it cannot be firmly established that East
Germany is pursuing its new assertive policies in Africa as
a sort of payoff for continued Soviet oil supplies and as a
partial fulfillment of its Warsaw Pact obligations, economic
factors, as in the case of Cuban involvement in Africa, cannot
23be discounted as a motivating factor. Add to this the
requirement for supplementary oil sources, and economic reasons
assume certain importance (albeit the level of importance is
difficult to determine) in East Germany's African policies.
The Cuban involvement is mentioned here because there are some
striking similarities between GDR and Cuban motivational fac-
tors. Specifically, the East Germans may be impressed with
the economic benefits Cuba has derived from the Soviet Union
as payment for Cuba's African activities.
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3. The NVA and SSD
In light of the NVA's total subordination to the
GSFG, there appears to be little room for professional mili-
tary cadres to establish an identity of their own. Croan has
noted that, "the matter of identity figures in a number of
different ways. One involves the .. .National People's Army
(NVA) • As an institution, its status is not particularly
24imposing at home." Perhaps the bottomline to the whole
process of subordination is that the National People's Army is
only "national" in that it does not consist of members of
other nations. Yet, some high officers of the NVA have Soviet
citizenship and some wear, next to Soviet decorations, the
25foreign order Victory over Fascist Germany. All this re-
flects the character of the NVA which appears to be more a
German contingent of the Soviet Army than an autonomous
"national" army. Furthermore, the designation as a "people's"
army applies only in so far as all men living in East Germany
can be conscripted.
The NVA's subordinate position apparently led to a
morale problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While this
is difficult to prove, one can piece together some evidence
which suggests that the NVA has indeed experienced this
problem. For example, in the early 1970 's, East German
military publications, most notably Volksarmee , noted a
resurgence of "nationalist tendencies" among the officer
corps, particularly among theofficer cadets. These
tendencies were manifested most visibly in criticism over
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the common use of the Russian language in the military, which
all officers were required to learn. Responding to the
apparent traditional nationalist feeling that the German
language is a basis for German unity, Volksarmee insisted that
people are united not by common expressions for formulating
thoughts and feelings but by a common class affiliation.
The former obviously draws the East Germans towards the
Federal Republic thus impeding further GDR-Soviet military
integration, while the latter serves to unite them with the
U.S.S.R.
Further, detente and rapprochement with West Germany
apparently had a negative effect upon the NVA. From the
SED ' s viewpoint (and one might also assume, the CPSU) the
movement towards detente and rapprochement adversely affected
the NVA, both in terms of combat preparedness and ideological
purity. There was apparently a feeling among members of the
NVA that since war was becoming less of a danger, then perhaps
the NATO allies were not so much of a threat. If this was so,
the need for continued preparedness seemed less urgent than
in the past. To ensure a continued high degree of loyalty
in the face of relaxation of tensions, then, the party has
sought to reemphasize the importance of the ideological purity
of the NVA officer. Political indoctrination takes many forms,
but most decidedly it underscores the glories and greatness of
Soviet-led socialist (or proletarian) internationalism and an
East German commitment to the same. Combat preparedness, on
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the other hand, was increased through greater integration with,
and subordination to, the GSFG.
The above discussion suggests that, if the NVA were
ever to improve its prestige and mission, it would have to
look beyond its domestic frontiers. It ultimately did so,
under the dynamic leadership of General Hoffman who, coinci-
dentally, was elevated to full Politburo membership in 1973.
With this rise in status, General Hoffman's presence in the
Politburo might have served as a factor in upgrading the NVA '
s
institutional position in the decision-making process.
Moreover, there appear to be some parallels between
the late 19th/early 20th century German exploits in Africa
and the NVA's current role there, as two authors explain:
The German colonial officer formed a corps d'elite.
Service in the colonies was highly sought after at a time
when the long peace in Europe seemed endless and when the
only shots heard by the average soldier were those dis-
charged on a firing range .. .Africa. . .had its compensa-
tions... It was an excellent school for real war,
especially guerrilla operations; there were plenty of
opportunites for initiative . 28
A high proportion of these of f icers . . . came from eastern
Germany... Silesia, West and East Prussia, Pomerania or
the Province Sachsen of the Prussian Kingdom. 29
German officers had professional reasons for service
abroad in the past, and African military experience was pre-
dominantly a Prussian affair. In a similar matter ..perhaps
some reasons for late twentieth century East German military
operations in Africa can be viewed in the same light. As in
the past, Africa offered again in the 1970's a unique oppor-
tunity to envigorate the morale of the armed forces.
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It cannot be unequivocably stated that the military
provided an institutional motivating force leading to the
GDR's new role in Africa. There is enough evidence, however,
to suggest that it has at least been one factor. In light of
this, it is interesting to note that the Cuban military
establishment has encouraged Cuba's own African experience."5
While more difficult to discuss substantively, the
SSD, under Paul Verner, the GDR Secretary for State Security,
probably also has institutional interests in mind for an
assertive security role in Africa, and perhaps elsewhere in
the Third World. Western analysts of East German foreign
policy, in fact, attribute a role in the decision-making
process to the military/security interest group. Then too,
Africa provides the SSD with abundant opportunites to under-
mine West German influence and prestige on the continent, as
may have been the case in the expose on OTRAG operations in
Zaire's Shaba province.
B. EXTERNAL FACTORS
1 . International Recognition
Perhaps no other factor had as great an impact on
the GDR's new military assertiveness in Africa than its
formal recognition, in the early 1970s, by the nations of
the world, as a legitimate state in the global environment.
This recognition came after nearly a quarter century of
pariah statehood which severely curtailed East German activi-
ties throughout the world. The Hallstein Doctrine died a
natural death, and the GDR, in concert with the Soviet Union,
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was finally more able to employ its political and military
prowess in new foreign policy endeavors,
2
.
The Soviet Union as a Mature Super-power
Having had its hands burned badly while practising
premature globalism in Cuba in 1962, the Soviet Union under-
took a gradual military buildup which culminated in nuclear
parity with the United States in the early 1970 's. The
changed correlation of forces was related not only to the
spectacular rise in Soviet military might, but also to the
perceived unwillingness of the United States to counter Soviet
moves into the Third World (in the wake of Vietnam). Addi-
tionally, Soviet conventional might, particularly its airlift
and sealift capabilities, was greatly enhanced, as was illus-
trated by Soviet-Cuban intervention during the Angolan civil
war in 1975-76 and during the battle for the Ogaden in
1977-78.
All these factors contributed to a more ambitious
foreign policy, specifically in the military and security
sphere, by the Soviet Union and its comrades-in-arms,
particularly Cuba and the GDR.
3
.
Increased Opportunites in Africa in the 1970 's
The early years of the 1970 's witnessed an intensifi-
cation of independence struggles by African National Libera-
tion Movements. The decline of the Portuguese empire in
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the con-
tinued racists policies of the white bastions in Rhodesia and
South Africa (including Namibia) , sparked increasing violence
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from indigenous forces. In Zaire, increased instability as
a result of economic depression and political corruption gave
renewed vigor to the Front for the National Liberation of the
Congo (FLNC)
, then operating from bases in Angola. Without
exception, all of these groups desired and needed more
intensive military and security aid and were willing to




Following World War II and continuing throughout the
decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Eastern European
bloc witnessed many de-stabilizing crises. Yugoslavia's 1948
defection, East German rioting in 1953, the Polish and
Hungarian events of 1956, the downfall of Krushchev in 1964,
the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, Soviet rifts with Albania, China and some of the
Western Communist parties, Romania's maverick policy within
the Warsaw Pact and CMEA (to name some of the more spectacular
events) all combined to place priority on greater unity and
integration of the Soviet-Eastern Europe alliance. Greater
cohesion and coordination of national policies were not merely
ends in themselves, but also the means (or at least a set of
conditions) that were perhaps perceived as necessary to launch
a drive outward, one which would increase the presence and







East Germany's Post-1968 Overshadowing of
Czechslovakia
'
In the 1950's and 60's, Czechoslovakia played the
major role, next to the Soviet Union, in both Eastern
European matters and Third World foreign policy. Czechoslo-
vakia had a substantial indigenous arms industry and was able
to provide developing countries with considerable numbers, and
varieties, of military equipment. Further, they also acted as
a "go -between" for the Soviet Union in arms deals when the
situation was deemed sensitive enough to xvarrant such a
scheme. (Jo wit: The Czech-Egyptian Arms deal of 1955).
Czechoslovakia's front-running position began to
decline in 1968, and it is justifiable to say (at least in
terms of defense budgetary matters, see Table III) that since
that time, although it still supplies arms to certain African
nations, it has been surpassed by the GDR in a variety of
military and security-related ways.
Also adding to East Germany's ascendancy over
Czechoslovakia was the decreased confidence the Soviets.had in
the country and its armed forces. Coincidentally , the GDR's
policy of close political/ideological alignment with the
Soviet Union paid off in terms of Soviet confidence in the
reliability of the NVA. Western observers, noting this change,
have subjectively evaluated, the overall utility of Warsaw-
Pact forces to the Soviets in a confrontation with NATO
forces, and have given the GDR (along with Bulgaria) top
24
ratings, while Czechoslovakia is rated at the bottom. It
can be hypothesized that the Eastern European reliability of
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the NVA can be translated into a concomitant reliability of
its forces in the Third World.
C. CONCLUSION
Starting in 1968 with the decreasing role of
Czechoslovakia, a continuing series of regional and global
events have coalesced to present new opportunities for in-
creased East German activities in Africa. In combination
with domestic determinants of East German foreign policy,
these forces propelled East Germany into the African arena in
a way which was as dramatic as it was unexpected. While
Communist-bloc activity in Africa in the 1970s was both
intensive and widespread, with the exception of the Soviet
Union and Cuba, no other Communist nation has pursued a more
assertive policy, at all levels of involvement (i.e. military/
security, political, and economic) than the GDR. The extent
of this involvement is the focus of the next section.
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V. THE SCOPE OF EAST GERMAN INVOLVEMENT
IN AFRICA
A. OVERVIEW
Any overall view of the GDR's role in Africa must be
pieced together from fragmentary information, from visits of
high-ranking East German delegations to Africa and of African
delegations to the GDR, and from public statements (East
German and African) on the subject. Because of the type of
activities the GDR is most highly involved in, for example
military and security training and organizing state political
parties along the same lines as the SED (and the CPSU) , the
East Berlin government is not particularly forthcoming about
the specifics of its activity. In fact, it wasn't until the
summer of 1978, following General Hoffman's African sojourn,
that the GDR admitted to providing military assistance. This
admission also came after Mengistu Haile Marian frankly
stated in a speech given just prior to the Eritrean offensive
in the spring of 1978:
Among our friends are the Soviet Union, Cuba, the
Republic of Yemen, East Germany and other truly
socialistic countries, which actively support us.
These comrades, after having travelled several
thousand kilometers, live, die and fight with us
and stand side by side with the Ethiopians and
their revolution . 31
Seemingly, the state chief had talked too much, because
this passage of the speech, given in Amharic, was missing
in the English version which was later broadcast by Radio
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Addis Ababa and printed in the Ethiopian press. When asked
to comment upon whether the East Germans were fighting in
Eritrea, East Berlin issued a "no comment" statement.
After General Hoffman's visit and Mengistu's slip of the
tongue, it apparently became clear to East Berlin that it
could no longer claim that its African efforts were solely in
the economic and educational fields, as previously espoused
by the regime. Lieutenant General Ernst Hampf, Chief of the
Main Political Administration of the NVA (and who had accom-
panied General Hoffman to Africa during the previous month)
admitted in an article in Volksarmee that the GDR was indeed
providing military assistance to Soviet and East German allies
in Africa, and that these relations were on the increase. °
The East Berlin weekly Horizont (a popular journal on foreign
policy) also picked up on this new line and defended the
presence of military representatives in Africa by noting that,
"Experts and military representatives of socialist countries
were temporarily in some African countries only by virtue of
treaties and agreements of the sovereign governments of these
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countries ..."
The national liberation movements, as well as selected,
"Communist-oriented" countries, have also been the objects
of East German attention. The GDR's involvement with various
national liberation movements began in 1973 when it granted
permission for the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO) to open
an office in East Berlin. Following that event, notable in
that Moscow did not grant similar permission (an act which




, contacts were established between the GDR and
three African liberation movements - the Zimbabi^e African
People's Union (ZAPU) , the Southwest Africa Peoples'
Organization (SWAPO)
, and the African National Congress (ANC)
of South Africa.
In December 1977, Mr. Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO,
signed a two-year cooperation agreement with the GDR while on
a visit to East Berlin. The agreement reportedly would pro-
vide "a solid basis for friendship and anti - imperialist
solidarity." " In May 1978, a similar two-year agreement was
concluded with the ANC which provided for the intensification
of cooperation between the GDR and ANC in 1978 and 1979.
This agreement was signed by the ANC's chairman, Oliver
Tambo, during his 15-22 May 1978 visit to East Berlin. A
statement issued at the conclusion of his visit stressed that:
Both sides evaluate the visit of the ANC delegation
to the GDR as useful for the further intensification
of traditional cooperation and solidarity in the
joint, anti-imperialist struggle. Concrete measures -,
for this were also laid down in the agreement signed.
Joshua Nkomo ' s ZAPU was not overlooked in the GDR-National
Liberation Movement solidarity campaigns. He made several
visits to the GDR and consulted with both Erich Honecker and
General Hoffman during their southern Africa sojourns. While
in East Berlin in July 1979, Nkomo held meetings with both of
these gentlemen. Upon departure, he noted that "this visit
confirmed the GDR's support for the front-line states and the
liberation movements. We are convinced that our friendly
relations will become even stronger in the future."^
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All three national liberation movements have opened
offices in East Berlin and have been granted, in the least,
quasi-diplomatic status. In fact, the GDR often refers to
national liberation movement representatives in East Berlin
as charge d'affaires.
Support to these three national liberation movements can
be summarized as follows:
1. "Solidarity" aid in the form of medical and educa-
tional supplies and assistance, clothing, food, and non-
military training. As of late 1979, ADN reported that 750
members of ZAPU, SWAPO and the ANC were in the GDR for
7 O
"vocational" training;
2. Military assistance in the form of treating wounded
soldiers both in Africa and the GDR, e.g. in July 1978, ADN
reported that 40 wounded SWAPO soldiers had arrived in East
39Berlin by a special Interflug Aircraft; training, and
advisory assistance. With regard to this latter aspect,
unidentified West German sources reported that 100 East
German military advisors trained Nkomo ' s ZAPU forces and
South African sources reported that East German forces in
Southern Angola were being built up "virtually every week",
with an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 along South Africa's
40borders. Although these GDR forces were thought to be
ZAPU opened its office in 1978, as did the ANC. SWAPO *
s
office opened officially in early 1979, although represen-




augmenting Cuban forces in the struggle against Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA forces, the South Africans now believe the
East Germans are preparing to adopt a more offensive role
and involve themselves in SWAPO ' s war against South African
troops along the Angola-Namibia border. Mr. H.J. Coetzee,
South Africa's Deputy Minister of Defense, stated in a tele-
vision interview in September 1979 that the East Germans are
a greater threat to South Africa than the 20,000 Cubans in
Angola. The East Germans superior knowledge of sophisticated
armaments had been important in the Angolan and Mozambican
struggles and the similarity of their language to Afrikaaner
was another advantage the East Germans had over the Cubans
41in regard to SWAPO and Namibia. Although these South
African reports are probably exaggerated, they do illustrate
an increasing concern with East German support for SWAPO, at
least from the South African perspective.
Finally, East Germany has made no secret of its sympa-
thies for Africa's liberation movements. It has been esti-
mated that the GDR is supporting these movements by as much
as 200,000,000 marks annually. A rhyme, originally printed in
the GDR armed forces weekly, Volksarmee , in 1978 perhaps best
describes what these marks are being used for:
Kalashnikoffs, not Coca Cola, bring self-determination
to Angola. 42
Table IV provides a five-year listing of high-level GDR
visits to African countries and gives a general indication of:





2. the increasing emphasis over the past two years on
military and security matters, as suggested by the visits of
Werner Lamberz and later (after Lamberz' death in Libya in
March 1978 under still unclear circumstances, i.e., there are
some suspicions that Lamberz" helicopter was sabotaged) by
General Hoffman. The contention that Lamberz' trips were at
least quasi-military/security in nature is made because those
countries which captured most of his attention, namely
Mozambique and Ethiopia, soon had East German- trained elite
guards (Mozambique) and internal security forces (both
countries). J In fact, Le Figaro reported in May 1978 that
Lamberz had played his African card well. "In June 1975, he
had examined the possibility of adding military aid to the
technical and economic aid supplied to fighting states."
Tables V and VI provide a listing of the number of Soviet,
Cuban and East German military and economic personnel, respec-
tively, in selected African countries. The numbers presented
are best estimates only, based on sources of information that
are, in some cases, three years old. The particular countries
listed were selected because they represent the most signifi-
cant areas of concentration of East German civilian and mili-
tary personnel. These tables illustrate that while Cuba, with
its high number of combat troops, far outpaces both the Soviet
Union and East Germany in total numbers (both military and
economic), the GDR's presence is not insignificant. This is
particularly illustrated when contrasted with the Soviet
numbers. The population of the Soviet Union is 15.3 times
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greater than the population of the GDR (261,300,000 to
17,000,000). Yet, in total numbers for the countries selec-
ted, the Soviet presence is only about 2.5 tines as great as
the East German presence.
The purpose of this section is not to examine in minute
detail the whole realm of relations which the GDR maintains
with Africa, but rather to focus on the military and security
aspects of East Germany's foreign policy with selected African
countries. This will be done through a case study approach.
B. CASE STUDIES
1. Angola, 19 75-79
The GDR reportedly signed a military agreement with
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in
1973 (the same year as the military agreement with the Congo-
Brazzaville) which provided for East German training of MPLA
forces, as well as for GDR military assistance to wounded
personnel evacuated from Angola to the Congo and thence to
45East Berlin for the more serious cases.
During the Angolan civil war, there were unsubstantia-
ted reports on the presence of at least 700 East German mili-
tary advisors; there were also unconfirmed reports of East
46Germans flying MIG-21s.
Since the MPLA victory, while available, confirmed
information is still limited about the exact nature of GDR
activities in Angola, it is generally agreed that the East
Germans are involved in organizing both civil and secret
50

police forces, in the setting up of a country-wide communica-
tions system, in port modernization (Luanda, Lopito and
Mocamedes)
,
in educational, cultural and health services and
in piloting ships into the harbors at Luanda and Lopito. With
regard to this last item, Neues Deutschland reported in 1978
that:
Nine GDR pilots have safely guided some 5,300 ships from
almost 50 countries into the Angolan ports of Luanda and
Lobito since 1976... at the same time, young Angolans are
being trained in this task. 47
"Solidarity goods" shipments continue to arrive in
Luanda, usually transported by special Interflug flights and
the GDR has sent a total of 6,000 four-wheel drive vehicles
(mostly W-50 type trucks) to the country. The exact nature
of the solidarity goods is unknown (but usually reported by
the East German press as food, educational and medical ..sup-
plies)
,
but could include military-related items such as small
weapons, communications gear, etc; the military applications
of the vehicles are obvious. That the GDR continues to pro-
vide direct military assistance, particularly in the form of
advisors, and perhaps even a small number of combat troops,
can only be ascertained by unsubstantiated reports originating
largely from South Africa (see, for example, the discussion of
support for national liberation movements in the earlier part
of this section) and from occasional communiques from the
Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC) , which
continues to fight against the MPLA. This group issued a
communique in August 1979 which alleged that three Cuban and
two East German soldiers, identified as missile launcher and
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4 8heavy arms technicians had been killed in Cabinda. These
reports are highly suspect, however, and subject to
exaggeration.
Whatever the exact extent and nature of GDR military
operations in Angola, its own highly publicized statements of
solidarity donations, and other economic, cultural and educa-
tional assistance rendered, illustrates not only a considerable
East German interest in the country but also a considerable
presence. And, the types of aid and assistance given, inclu-
ding perhaps most importantly the training of security and
police forces and organizational work with party cadre, are all
consistent with GDR tasks in the division of labor on the
African continent.
2. Shaba I and II, 1977-1978
Washington Post columnist David Ottaway, writing in
the International Herald Tribune , has said that Shaba II was,
without a doubt, one of the best planned and executed opera-
tions seen anywhere in Africa for years. "The rebels were
tough, determined and tenacious as if they had long been
training for the assault." He went on to state that this is
the greatest evidence, although only circumstantial, of foreign
involvement
.
Implicated in the second Shaba invasion in May 1978
(14 months after Shaba I which failed, largely due to Western
military action - as was the case in Shaba II) were first and
foremost, the Soviet Union and Cuba; but the GDR also had
Western allegations directed at it. There is enough available
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evidence from open-source literature to suggest that the GDR
was involved if not in the planning of Shaba II, then certain-
ly in the training of the rebel forces.
It is not the purpose of this section to give a de-
tailed account of the military actions of opposing forces in
the Shaba incidents. Rather, the intent is to review the evi-
dence which points to a GDR role in the invasions, as another
indicator of an expanding East German military role in Africa,
Following the return of the defeated Shaba I FLNC
forces to Angola, fighting erupted between the various
factions of the movement. Cuban forces were sent into the
area, in northeastern Angola, to quell the disturbances, but
once the fighting subsided, the Cubans were withdrawn and
East German military advisors were sent in to train the
FLNC forces
.
The East Germans were reportedly assigned the task of
destabilizing the Mobutu regime in 1976. The main points of
the plan to accomplish this objective were:
1. To provide military equipment to the FLNC, based
in Angola and under the leadership of General Nathaniel
Mbumba. The military aid reportedly included surface-to-air
missiles (SAM) to provide a strike capacity, should that be
needed, against Zaire's air force. SAM's were used on the
first day of the March 1977 Shaba I invasion, according to
Colin Legum of the London Observer.
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2. To create 45 pockets of continuing resistance
inside Shaba province, which would be supplied from the main
FLNC bases at Luso, Texeira de Sousa and Henrique de Carvalho
A large number of Czech heavy duty personnel transporters
were also reportedly delivered to the FLNC. Ji
A 100-man contingent, under the direct control
of Lieutenant General Helmut Poppe, General Hoffman's right-
hand man in African affairs, was assigned responsibility for
training the FLNC but under no conditions was the contingent
to become involved in actual combat, even at the price of
failure of their assignment.
While none of the above -discussed evidence can be veri-
fied, there is additional "circumstantial" evidence which
tends to implicate the GDR in the Shaba invasions:
1. East German and Soviet propaganda had flowed freely
over the presence of the West German Orbital Launch and
Rocket Firm (OTRAG) in the Shaba province after the OTRAG-
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Zaire treaty was stolen from Zaire's embassy in Bonn. One
of Dr. Luts Kayser's (the founding father of OTRAG) prime
reasons for picking Shaba as the site for his rocket
development was the relative security provided by the iso-
lated, sparsely populated area west of Lake Tanganika. Any
instability in the area would, of necessity, interfere with
rocket testings; Shabas I and II provided that instability
(and eventually forced OTRAG out of the country in early
1979). The East German-Soviet campaign against OTRAG was
probably .aimed not only at West Germany (although East
5 4

German propagandist must have appreciated the opportunity
to undermine West German prestige and influence and to,
perhaps, get some revenge from its earlier African failures
due to the FRG's Hallstein Doctrine), but also at the
People's Republic of China (PRC) , which was interested in
purchasing OTRAG ' s launching services after its own satel-
lite testing program ran into difficulties. Thus, the
Soviet's payoff was to be a blow delivered to a main rival
in Africa.
2. General Heinz Hoffman, accompanied by LTGEN Poppe,
visited Angola from 8 to 12 May 1978. The two were accom-
panied by Angola's Defense Minister, Henrique Teles Carreira,
throughout their Angolan sojourn, and this group reportedly
paid a side-trip to the bases at Luso, Texeira de Sousa
and Henrique de Carvalho on 8 May. It is interesting to
note that Neues Deutschland
,
which extensively covered
General Hoffman's Angola visit, failed to report these 8 May
activities. This leaves the impression that he either
didn't make the visit as reported by The Observer and Radio
Free Europe, or that the sensitivity of the visit three
days before Shaba II precluded their inclusion in East
German news coverage of General Hoffman's visit.
3. During the weeks before the attack on Shaba in May
1978, the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland bought all
the available cobalt on the world market. The price tripled
within a few days, and it would seem that these three
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countries knew exactly what they were doing and what was
about to transpire in the cobalt-rich Shaba province.
3. The Horn of Africa and South Yemen, 1977-1979
East Germany shifted in lock step with the Soviet
Union from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977. Werner Lamberz' three
visits to that country in 1977 (see Table IV) would appear
to indicate an increasing awareness of and commitment to
the "Ethiopian revolution." South Yemen, which has close
ties with the GDR, was included in the last two (June and
December 1977) of these trips, while Somalia was visited in
the first trip (^February 1977) but not in the succeeding
two, a good indicator as to where the GDR's interests lay
(in conjunction, of course, with the Soviet's interests).
The South Yemeni forces which fought in the Ogaden were
reportedly trained by the GDR, and East Germans may have
actually been involved in combat in the Eritrean offensive
in the spring of 1979. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),
complaining to the OAU in July 1979, stated in part that the
massive offensive was launched by 50,000 troops from
Ethiopia, while East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman




GDR-Ethiopian military relations were solidified by
a military cooperation agreement signed in Ethiopia in
May 1979 (during General Hoffman's visit). Calling for the
creation of a close relationship between the Ethiopian and
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GDR armed forces, General Hoffman witnessed the signing
of the treaty by Werner Fleischer, head of technology and
armaments in the GDR Defense Ministry and Colonel Abebe
Wolde Mariam, Chief of Supply in the Ethiopian Defense
Ministry. ' Upon his return home, General Hoffman stated,
in an interview with Horizont
,
that he had watched "thousands
of the sons of former slaves and landless peasants practis-
ing assaults with GDR machine guns and helmets," in the
"Tatek" training base of the Ethiopian People's Militia.
He also noted that, "The memory of Comrade Werner Lamberz is
cherished. .. and his name is indelibly linked with the friend-
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ship and revolutionary combat community of our peoples."
General Hoffman's allusion to Lamberz tends to confirm that
the latter's African missions were also of a military nature.
Like Angola, Ethiopia is also the recipient of
quantities of East German solidarity goods. In essence, the
GDR provides Ethiopia with essentially the same services as
it does for Angola, including port modernization. GDR
engineers are reportedly responsible for removal of the war
damage in Massawa and for building a dry dock which will be
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capable of accommodating ships up to cruiser size. The
latter, of course, would benefit the Soviet Navy in a great
way by providing close-by repair and maintenance facilities




While the GDR appears to have cemented its relation-
ships with both Angola and Ethiopia (it has treaties of
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with both, as
well as with Mozambique) , and its support for liberation
movements seems to set it in good stead there (with the
exception of ZAPU which is in the minority in Robert
Mugabe's new Zimbabwe government), the dynamics of the
region are such that today's solid friends can quickly
become tomorrow's foes. The Soviet Union has been the
victim of the uneven political scene in Africa, and the
GDR experienced the same roller-coaster effects of foreign
policy in Africa during its early involvement there. Then
too, recent events in the area, most notably the Zimbabwe
settlement, which could have some positive effects upon
Nambia and perhaps even South Africa, serve to place con-
straints upon further East German inroads on the continent.
It is these constraints to which we now turn.
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VI. LIMITS OF EAST GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA
A. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
East Germany's potential for influence in Zimbabwe was
delivered a blow when Robert Mugabe's faction of the Patriotic
Front won the majority of seats in the recent election. In
fact, the GDR's support for Nkomo ' s ZAPU minority faction
appears to have already come back to haunt the East Germans.
They (as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland) were omitted from
the list of invitees for Zimbabwe's independence day celebra-
tions, a severe diplomatic setback. Although the Soviet Union
was invited, because of its support for Nkomo, Soviet repre-
sentation in Zimbabwe will also be limited, according to
Zimbabwean government officials. Whatever, the course of
state relations between the GDR and Zimbabwe in the future,
the end of fighting spelled the end of East Germany's pro-
viding the guerrillas with solidarity and military assistance.
While Zimbabwe and East Germany may at some point enjoy normal
diplomatic relations, the GDR and its Soviet comrades, but not
the Cubans apparently, have essentially been excluded from the
main stream of Zimbabwe's political life.
Elsewhere, the resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe may
give impetus to further attempts at a peaceful settlement in
Namibia. In this case, however, the GDR's lengthy support
for SWAPO could portend a continuing East German influence
in Namibia. But as has been the case in many countries, once
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the fighting stops, economic development seems to take
priority over ideology, and economic development implies
seeking help from those most capable of giving it, i.e., the
Western nations. This is now the case in Mozambique, for
example, where Samora Machel has taken measures to improve
the investment climate in his country. While not denying
Mozambiques
' s continued commitment to socialism, President
Machel has noted that "there is a place in our economic
development effort for the participation of international
firms and foreign capital." An irony of the Mozambican
situation is that the GDR's port modernization efforts
(Maputu) are being used by Mozambique to improve conditions
for Western investments in the country.
There is, of course, still the question of the continua-
tion of conflict in Namibia. But the Zimbabwe situation has
demonstrated that enough pressure, from the right sources,
applied in the right direction can bring a favorable conclu-
sion to a seemingly hopeless situation. The Zimbabwe lesson
cannot be lost in the minds of the parties to the Namibia
conflict
.
East German involvement with the FLNC could present
opportunities for a continued role in the de-stabilizing of
the Mobutu regime in Zaire. But, to a great extent that
situation appears to be holding up, and the FLNC rebels who
were not repatriated to Zaire are currently reported to have
taken refuge in Guinea-Bissau, having been expelled from
Angola, and there is no information to suggest that the GDR
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continues its involvement with the FLNC. The problem is, of
course, that Zaire's internal problems contribute to regime
instability and offer opportunites for renewed violence,
perhaps with external assistance, in that country.
Fighting in Angola continues unabated providing many
opportunities for East German involvement. But here again,
there exists the possibility that the Zimbabwe settlement
could positively affect the resolution of conflict between
the MPLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces.
Perhaps the greatest potential area for heightened con-
flict is in the Republic of South Africa where the govern-
ment's cosmetic concessions to the Black populace have not
quelled either dissent or violence. The exiled ANC may view
the coming to power of a Black majority government in Zimbabwe
as a boon to its own power and prestige. At the least, Black
South Africa must perceive that it was only through a long,
intense war that Zimbabwe was able to emerge from the crumb-
ling foundations of the White-ruled Rhodesia. If this latter
assessment is correct, then a scaling up of civil warfare^in:;.
South Africa could be expected, and East Germany, with a
history of support for the ANC, would be expected to take an
active role in the military operations. Admittedly, this
scenario is highly speculative; perhaps another scenario
(though not as likely) might be one in which the South African
government, having witnessed the turmoil of its neighbor to
the north, will move more positively towards racial equality
and, perhaps, circumvent warfare on its own territory.
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While this is a-11 speculative, it does suggest that the
potential exists for a tempering of conflicts in southern
Africa. If such a situation were to occur, the GDR's activi-
ties (as well as the Soviets) could be constrained and its
influence diminished. The ultimate irony would be that after
years of increasing effort and expense, it would find itself
in no better position than it did in its original African
experience.
B. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
East Germany is not without domestic problems which could
militate against an expanding foreign policy in Africa.
While Erich Honecker had hoped to achieve at least an
economically based legitimacy by raising standards of living,
the progress the GDR has made (its per capita GNP is the
highest in the Eastern bloc and surpasses even some Western
nations) has not eliminated continuing shortages of consumer
goods. Furthermore, the new relative open-door policy with
the FRG constantly focuses the East German population's
attention upon its more affluent neighbor. To alleviate
this situation (and also to obtain hard currency) , the regime
has presided over an expanding network of Inter-shops
(termed internal exports by some) which offer Western goods
not normally available elsewhere, in exchange for hard
currency (usually obtained from relatives in the West)
.
Despite the regime's efforts to satisfy growing consumer
discontent, the basic flaws in the economic system make for
a very uncomfortable situation and could presage increasing
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domestic social unrest. Further, Croan has noted that:
As East Germany enters its fourth decade, its prospects
are anything but bright. It seems clear that the eco-
nomic goals planned for 1979 will not be attained and
that the annual growth rate of the GDR economy will have
fallen yet again... the cost of the state's subsidization
of consumer prices has risen sharply, almost assuring
that once the thirtieth anniversary celebrations are
over, selected price rises, if not indeed an across-the-
board increase, will soon follow. 62
Domestic discontent has, in turn, led to a number of
measures designed to control both its own population and
visitors (particularly newsmen) from the West, signifying
that the inherent lack of legitimacy continues to plague
the regime. In April 1979, following West German television
interviews with disgruntled East Berlin shoppers, severe
new restrictions were place on foreign reporters' movements
and access to East German citizens. Then, in August 1979
the regime revised the penal code providing for prison
sentences for such offenses as denigration of the state and
disturbing the socialist way of life. Richard von
Weizacker, Bundestag Vice-Speaker, notes the conflict between
West Germany's Ostopolitik to obtain more openness and free-
dom of movement of ideas and information - and the East
German aim of getting Western money and economic assistance.
Both have succeeded to some extent, but the political price
has been much higher for East Germans than for West Germans
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in terms of challenging their entire closed system.
Because of its virtual complete control over its popu-
lace, a major challenge to the regime's authority is not
likely under present conditions. However, other variables
could intervene which could affect the regime's ability to
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control its people - =' a change in Soviet leadership
(following Brezhnev's death when that occurs), for example.
There is, of course, a precedent for such a thing. Follow-
ing the insecurity felt in Eastern Europe after Stalin's
death in 1953, and combined with a depressed economy, East
German workers rioted in East Berlin and elsewhere, and
Soviet troops and tanks had to be called in to quell the
a- * u 65disturbances
.
While this is, perhaps, an extreme example of what might
happen, there is no denying the current domestic unrest in
the GDR. Whether or not it might have an effect upon the
regime's ability to continue its expanding activities in
Africa (and perhaps elsewhere in the strategic Third World)
is debatable. Yet, some things are certain. The regime
needs to take measures at home, particularly in the economy,
to quell social unrest or run the risk of exacerbating the
problem of its own stability, and opportunites afield seem
to be narrowing - at least in Africa. In combination, these
two sets of conditions might cause the regime to rethink its
foreign policy and perhaps place more emphasis on domestic
policy and/or to become involved more deeply in the areas
of the Third World which offer new opportunities: in the
Caribbean basin (Jamaica, Grenada and Nicaragua) or in Asia





1979 witnessed several major events which could portend
a change in which areas of the world receive international
attention in the current decade. The first was the disposal
of the Shah of Iran which quickly brought instability to the
Middle East. In July 1979 Marxist- leaning Sandinista guerril
las toppled the 43-year old Somoza family dynasty in
Nicaragua. Equally unsettling is the near civil war in El
Salvador, the events in Grenada where the first coup in the
history of the English-speaking Caribbean brought a pro-Cuba
Marxist government to power, and the ouster of conservative
governments in favor of leftist regimes elsewhere. Then, in
late 1979 came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, now evolv-
ing into what could be a long, drawn-out war.
All these events could spell great changes in the foreign
policies of East Germany's brothers -in-arms (i.e. the USSR
and Cuba) in Africa. The resurgence of religious fundamental-
ism on the Soviet Union's borders must, of necessity, carry
great weight in the Kremlin decision-making organs. The
invasion of Afghanistan can probably be most accurately
viewed in the context of the need to stabilize the area and
to prevent the fervor of Islam from spilling over into the
Soviet Central Asian Republics with their high proportion of
Muslims. In a broader context,. Afghanistan (and Iran) are
only two nations constituting the whole "Arc of Crisis" which
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sweeps across the Soviet Union's exposed southern flank, from
European Turkey to Pakistan. Continued instability in this
area could have serious repercussions on the Soviet's ability
to further extend themselves in far-off southern Africa.
Cuba too, is not without constraints in its African
foreign policy. Domestic turmoil at home has recently
reached the boiling point, a sign that many Cubans are not
happy with Mr, Castro's failures to deliver the fruits of
the revolution which he promised would happen during the
1970s. Multiplying these woes has been the dispatch and
stationing of soldiers to fight in African wars - as well as
the depletion of Cuba's reserve of professionals and tech-
nicians by the sending of civilian advisors to many African
countries. Taken together, all these factors have produced
a formidable undercurrent which finally surfaced in April
1930, with literally thousands of Cubans seeking to leave the
island, any way they could and as fast as they could. Mr.
Castro, then, may well have his hands full at home. Adding
to the impetus to look to his own backyard is the revolution-
ary wave now sweeping the Caribbean. It is this area which
once was Castro's great hope for exporting revolution. Having
failed at his own doorstep, he took to Africa; now, however,
he may see renewed opportunities and has, in fact, inter alia,
sent construction workers, a handful of doctors, and reported-
ly military advisors to Grenada. Of particular significance,
Cuban engineers are building an airport in Grenada which will
increase not only the size of civilian aircraft that can fly
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into the country, but also military aircraft (the airfield
could, for example, handle the Soviet Backfire bomber).
These events, in toto, may portend a refocussing of both
the Soviet Union's and Cuba's foreign policy. This is not to
imply that Africa will be abandoned, only that it may receive
lesser attention in the 1980s than the 1970s as the Soviet
Union seeks to stabilize the Arc of Crisis and as Cuba in-
creasingly exploits new opportunities in the Caribbean basin.
What does all this mean for the foreign policy of the
GDR? There are several scenarios which could be envisioned.
1. If the Soviet Union were to place decreasing emphasis
on Africa, the GDR as a politically reliable, enthusiastic and
competent ally in the coordinated socialist foreign policy
could possibly assume a greater role on the continent, in
part compensating for a decreasing Soviet role. More weight
might be added to the likelihood of this scenario if Cuba
were to reorient itself towards the Caribbean. As long as
East Germany remains loyal to Soviet objectives and is willing
to carry out a closely coordinated policy with the USSR, this
may be a viable option for the Soviet Union. East Germans are
reportedly more acceptable to many Africans than their Soviet
(and even Cuban) counterparts, and their long-term support for
both the national liberation movements and socialist- leaning
countries has earned them prestige and status that could be
usefully employed in furthering Soviet objectives in Africa.
2. Another scenario might be for the Soviet Union to
increasingly employ East Germany in the Arc of Instability.
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Specifically, Afghanistan, South Yemen and even Iran could
become the focus of GDR attentions in the current decade.
East Germany has in fact been extensively involved in mili-
tary and security matters in South Yemen and has recently
concluded agreements in the economic sphere with Iran.
Afghanistan offers several interesting possibilities. East
Germany has been quick to offer solidarity aid to Babrak
Karmal's goverment and has been flying wounded Afghani
soldiers to East Berlin for medical treatment. Perhaps even
more interesting was the visit to Moscow in early December
(just prior to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) of
Willi Stoph and General Hoffman, during v/hich they reportedly
held discussions with Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, General
A.I. Gribkov, the Pact ground forces commander, General I.
Pavlovskii, and the military commanders of the Soviet Central
69Asian Republics bordering on Afghanistan. Then, in early
April 1980, General A. Epishev, head of the Soviet Main
Political Administration, suggested in Pravda that the Soviet
Union might be calling upon its Warsaw Pact allies to send
70troops to Afghanistan. While East Germany may not be
overly enthusiastic about this latter possibility, particu-
larly about the stress it might put on GDR-FRG relations, its
choice in the matter may be limited by the leverage Moscow
maintains over it.
3. Increased East German activity in the Caribbean basin
cannot be overlooked as a possible future scenario. Since
Somoza's ouster (perhaps even before), the GDR has provided
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the Sandinist government with economic and medical assistance
(Nicaraguan soldiers, like the Afghanis, are flown to East
Berlin for treatment)
. A high-level GDR delegation, led by
Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, has visited Managua, and an
equally high-level Nicaraguan delegation, including the
Minister of National Defense, has visited East Berlin. During
this latter visit, which occurred in late March - early April
1980, trade, economic, cultural and "other" unspecified
agreements were signed. Continuing instability in the region
could open up new doors and provide ample opportunites for a
bold East German policy aimed at fostering its image as a
firm supporter of progressive forces. In light of East German
activities in Latin America, it is interesting to note that
the GDR and Cuba recently signed a 25 year friendship agree-
ment in which both countries pledged to support "the struggles
of peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against
imperialism."
At this point in time, even the decision makers in East
Berlin may not know the exact direction of their foreign
policy in the 1980 's; much is dependent upon the direction
their Kremlin comrades take. What can probably be reasonably
assumed however, is that, as v/as the case in Africa, the GDR
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WARSAW PACT MI L ITARY EXPENDITURES*/MILITARY
EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP
Country 1958 1967 1968 1978
Bulgaria 156.3.7% 222/2.4% 238/2.3% 504/2.8%
Czechoslovakia 1089/4.5% 1232/4.3% 1322/4.1% 1885/3.9%
GDR 521/2.3% 1137/3.3% 1521/4.2% 2636/4.5%
Hungary - - 275/2.1% 338/2.4% 548/2.4%
Poland 602/3.0% 1345/3.8% 1517/4.0% 2339/2.9%
Romania 288/3.1% 412/1.9% 460/2.0% 904/--
*Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars at 1973 exchange
rates and prices
.
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 19 79, World Armaments and Dis -

























Talks on further develop-
ment of bilateral relation:
Also met with Mahnud
Riyad, Arab League General
Secretary
.
























tions ;FRG was not invited
to this or to Mozambique's
ce lebrat ions
.
Agreements signed on coop-
eration for 1976 - 19 77 in
the fields of culture,
science, technology and
trade, ar. d on air transpor'
Talks on expanding all-
around cooperation;
SiadBarre paid tribute to
the training of Somali
"cadres" in the GDR, the
sending of GDR experts to
Somalia, and the work of
the FDJ (Free German
Youth) Brigade .
Although no high-level GDR delegation visited Angola prior to its indepen-
day on 11 November 19"5, an Angolan delegation, led by Iko Carreira, MPLA
Politburo member and subsequently Angolan Minister for Defense, visited the
GDR from 21 - 26 August 1975. The MPLA delegation thanked the GDR for the
political, moral and material support rendered to theMPLA's struggle from the
beginning. Discussions between the two sides centered around the further
development and deepening of MPLA/SED relations. The MPLA delegation also
met with Kurt Krueger, General Secretary of the Solidarity Commi ttee, and
discussed further GDR solidarity support for Angola.
•Following Mr. Kleiber's return to the GDR, he was questioned by H0RI20NT
about the agreements. He responded by noting that the GDR would dispatch
to Angola primarily advisors and experts in "various" fields, and that the
GDR would continue to train cadres of superior and professional schools as
well as specialists of Angola - a training program which, he stated, was
initiated several years ago.
73

TABLE IV (Cont ' d)
Date Delegation Head Countries Visited Purpose/Salient Activitie:








treaty and "other" agree-
ments signed;
Saiora Machel noted that
through this visit the




Ethiopia: Trade and Cul-









June 1977 Werner Lamberz South Yemen/Eth-
ia/
g
tural agr eemen t signed.
Somalia : Agreement on coop-
eration ( undefined) signed
for 1977 - 1978 .
Mozambique: Attendance at
3rd FRELI MO Congress; met
with Josh u a Skomo ( Z A P U ) ,
Robert Mugabe (ZANU) , Oli-
ver Tambo (ANC) , and Sam
Nujoma ( SWAPO )
.
Ethiopia : Talks on the
further d evelopin g of
re lati ons hips,- visited a
"poli tica 1 school" in
Addis Aba ba where revol-
utionary cadres are train e dj
talks on ideological ori-
entation of the masses.
Ethiop ia : A number ofouuuii lcuicu - -n ^ mio i n iuiu*^ c: a. *-/ j_
iop /Angola/Congo/ agreements signed, aimed
Ni eria/Zambia at the all-around strength
ening of cooperation
visited training camps
of the People's Militia;
handed over M600,000 of
a solidarity donation;
signed a protocol on
long-term development of
economic realtions.
Zambia : Signed protocol
on cooperation which pro-




the expansion of relations
at the state level as well
as between trade unions,
women's and youth organ-
izations, and for grant-





TABLE IV (Cont ' d)
Date Delegation Head Countries Visited Purpose/Salient Activities
October 1977 Hermann Axen , Libya
Politburo Member
Several coopeation agree-
ments signed. Upon his
return to the GDR, Axer.
noted that the GDR popu-
lation's solidarity with
Libya had practically
opened the door in Libya,
giving the GDR prestige
and s tatus
.






Attendance at 3rd Congress
PAIGC; brief stopover ir.
Algeria en route
.
November 1977 Wolfgang Rauchfuss Ethiopia
Minister for Mater-
ial Management
Talks on economic, comm-
unications, land and mar-
ine transport cooperation
and assistance; talks or.
progress of the Ethiopian
revolution with politic:-
military affairs officials
December 1977 Horst Sindermann Angola/Sao Tome
Politburo Member; and Principe
President, Presi-
dium of the People's
Chamber
Angola : Addressed the
1st Congress of the M?L:
Sao Tome and Principe :
Economic agreement sign-
agreement on cooperatic:
for 1978 - 1930 signed.
December 1977 Werner Lamberz South Yemen/
Ethiopia/Libya
Ethiopia : More discus-
sions on the deepening
of re lations
.
Libya : Working agree-
ment signed which repcr.-
edly laid down the next
steps for further devel-
opment of bilateral rela-
tions .
March 1971 Werner Lamberz Libya Further discussions on
bilateral relations;
W. Lamberz killed in a
helicopter crash on 6
March
.
May 1978 Gene r al Heinz






training of African troops
by East Germans. In a
speech in Brazzaville,
General Hoffman stated,
"Let us make our comrade-








TABLE IV (Cont ' d)
Date De legati on Head Countries Visited
February 1979 Erich Honecker Libya/Angola/Moz-
(first visit by ambique/Zambia
the head of state/
head of party to
Africa)












with Angola and Mozambique-




May 1979* General Hoffmar. Zambia /Mozambique/
Ethiopia
Ethiopia -. Military agree-
ment s igned
.
Zambia : In Lusaka/ Gen-
eral Hoffman stated that
the GDR would arm the
front-line states to the
teeth.






the deepening of cooper-
ation in foreign trade
and industry; agreements
signed on cooperation in
the construction of "im-
portant" projects as well
as on long-term economic
cooperation
eptember 1979 Willi Stoph Angola Attended funeral of Pres-
ident Antonio Agostinho
Neto
September 1979 Korst Cohlus,
Politburo Candi-
date Member
Ethiopia Attended 5th anniversary
of the Ethiopian revolu-
tion.
November 1979 Erich Hcnecker Ethiopia Signed treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation.
*Perhaps connected with this statement by General Hoffman, the government
of Zambia announced in early 1980 that it was purchasing twelve MIG-21s
from the Soviet Union. It can be speculated (but not verified) that Gen-
eral Hoffman and Kenneth Kaunda discussed this arms transfer deal and that




MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES
Country USSR CUBA* GDR
Algeria 1,000 15 1,000




Congo -Brazzaville 50 300 20
Guinea-Bissau 65 140 100
Libya 1,300 100 30
Mozambique 250 800 200




There are unconfirmed reports that at least 1,500 East
German military technicians may be in Ethiopia. The figure
listed here was provided by the West German Ministry for
Intra-German Relations on 28 April 1980.
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign




David D, Newsom, "Communism in Africa," Africa Repor t 25
(January - February 1980) : 46
.
Interview with Dr. Siegfried Georg, Ministry for Intra-
German Relations, 28 April 1980.
Cuban figures are derived from various sources (inter
alia): L'Express (Paris)
,
September 1, 1978; El National
(Caracas^ Interview with Fidel Castro, July W, 1978; Radio
Havana, November 25, 19 79 and December 8, 19 79; Baltimore
Sun
,
20 March 1980; Report on Radio Havana's coverage of





























Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign
Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-
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TT7T.
Radio Havana, November 23, 1979 and December 8, 1979.
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20 March 1980; Report on Radio Havana's cover-




The Hallstein Doctrine, named after its originator,
Dr. Walter Hallstein (a former Common Market president and
Konrad Adenauer's first secretary for foreign affairs), was
formulated in the late 1950s and proscribed diplomatic ties
with any country that recognized East Germany. Implied in
the doctrine was the idea that the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG) was the sole legitimate authority capable of
speaking and acting for the German nation. Withdrawal of
diplomatic ties carried with it withdrawal of all economic
ties, a condition which few developing African nations were
prepared to accept. Thus, the doctrine served the FRG well
in its actions against GDR initiatives in Africa.
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